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Comments

ICSID's Resurgence in International
Investment Arbitration: Can the Momentum
Hold?
David R. Sedlak*
I.

Introduction

In an ever-increasing globalization of the world economy, there
exists the realistic probability of disputes arising between parties from
international investment transactions. The existence of such disputes
calls for an effective method of international, or preferably a-national,
dispute resolution to ensure the continued expansion of international
business transactions.1 A person from one country, in an investment
disagreement with a person from another country, must have a neutral
forum for having the disagreement resolved or otherwise risk having a
* J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University-The Dickinson School of
Law, 2005; B.S., West Chester University of Pennsylvania, 1998. The author would like
to thank the Alternative Dispute Resolution faculty of the Dickinson School of Law,
especially Professor Thomas E. Carbonneau, for their inspiration and guidance, the
editorial staff of the Penn State International Law Review for their fine work with his
comment and all aspects of the publication, and to his family for their unending support
in making this comment, and this career, possible. AEA.
1. See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 32-33 (rev. 3d ed. 2003).
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judgment issued by a State that is slanted to protect the interests of its
own citizens.2 That same person must also have reasonable assurances
that a decision will be enforceable against the other party, no matter the
particular country executing the decision.3
One method of dispute resolution that has become popular in
Arbitration has
international investment disputes is arbitration.
numerous advantages over the more-traditional judicial process: the
ability to predetermine what national or international law will apply to
govern the dispute, if not a-national law; the ability to formulate the
scope of the arbitration agreement; and the ability to agree, before a
dispute arises, precisely how such disputes will be adjudicated.4 Based
on the universally accepted maxim pacta sunt servanda (commitments
must be honored), parties can agree on the method of dispute resolution
and the applicability of the result without knowing the particulars of the
dispute.5
As a means of fostering global investments and providing a neutral
forum for international investment dispute resolution, the World Bank
established The International Convention for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes ("ICSID" or "ICSID Convention") in 1966.6 The
Convention allowed private investors of States that have signed the
2. See id. at 767-70.
3. Id. Individuals and corporations alike can have assets scattered throughout the
globe. The laws of the State where particular assets are located govern any disposition of
those assets. Thomas E. Carbonneau, International Commercial Arbitration: The
Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1189, n.9 (2003). If a party wins a judgment, and attempts to collect
judgment against assets located in another State, State law may prevent the winning party
from doing so for any number of reasons. Id. For example, if a tribunal that includes a
woman arbitrator renders an award, that award may not be enforceable in Islamic
countries, leaving the winning party with a verdict, but little else. Id.
4. There are numerous articles detailing the specific advantages of arbitration in an
international context. See, e.g., Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A
Pleafor ReassessingBias under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 419,
434-38 (2000) (stating that arbitrations offer quick settlement by experts in the field,
informal and cordial dispute resolution, and a neutral forum for such a resolution); Peter
D. Ehrenhaft, Effective International CommercialArbitration, 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
1191, 1194 (1977) (contending that arbitration is informal, quick, private, convenient,
and inexpensive); Lawrence Perlman & Steven C. Nelson, New Approaches to the
Resolution of International Commercial Disputes, 17 INT'L LAW. 215, 218-25 (1983)
(arguing that arbitration minimizes problems of forum shopping, concurrent jurisdiction,
and limited access to pretrial discovery inherent in international litigation).
5. Shalakany, supra note 4, at 459 ("[P]actasunt servanda as a legal principle is
itself the subject of unsurpassed international consensus: No international jurisdiction
whatsoever has ever had the least doubt as to the existence, in international law, of the
rule pacta sunt servanda.").
6. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: About ICSID at
http://www.worldbank.com/icsid/about/about.htm (last visited May 23, 2004) [hereinafter
About ICSID].
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Convention to invest freely in foreign States that have also signed the
Convention, particularly in developing countries, without the fear of
losing the investment due to issues such as sovereign immunity from suit
if a dispute were to occur.7 In 1978, the Administrative Council of the
Center authorized the Secretariat to administer, at the request of the
parties concerned, certain proceedings between States and nationals of
other States that fall outside the scope of the Convention, thus allowing
ICSID arbitrations to take place when only one of the parties was a
signatory to the Convention.8 At the time of its creation, ICSID was
"hailed as a great achievement of World Bank diplomacy and innovative
thinking in the pursuit of increased international investment for
development." 9
ICSID, for all its advantages, was rarely utilized in its first twenty
years, having only twenty-one disputes submitted between its inception
and 1984.10 Many commentators questioned whether ICSID was going
to be as effective as initially thought.1" However, there has been an
explosion in the number of ICSID arbitrations in the past ten years, as
well as in the number of signatory states. 12
This comment investigates the possible causes of the explosion of
cases, and evaluates whether ICSID arbitration, as it exists today, can
continue to grow and expand. Part II of this comment examines the
historic purpose of ICSID arbitration, from the reasons for its inception
to its present-day benefits and limitations, and examines whether these
limitations will stunt the growth of ICSID arbitration in the future. Part
III examines possible reasons for the explosion in the number of ICSID
arbitrations, including the dramatic rise in the number of bilateral
investment treaties (BITs), the opening of numerous new world markets,
and the increased willingness of parties to invest in developing countries.
Part IV takes a close look at one of the largest concerns with ICSID

7.

See generally id.

8. The Administrative Council is established by the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for
signature Mar. 18, 1965, 7 U.S.T. 2197, T.I.A.S. No. 3620, 264 U.N.T.S. 117, reprinted
in 4 I.L.M. 532, art. 4 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. It is composed of the same
individuals as the World Bank's Board of Governors. The powers and responsibilities of
the Administrative Council are detailed in ICSID Convention, art. 4-8.
9. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Forward to CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY, at xv, xv-xvi (2001).

10. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: List of Concluded
Cases [hereinafter Concluded Cases], at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
conclude.htm (last visited May 23, 2004).
11. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign Investment:
The Role of the World Bank, with ParticularReference to ICSID and MIGA, 1 AM. U.J.
INT'L. L. & POL'Y 97, 104-06 (1986).
12. See Concluded Cases, supra note 10.
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arbitration: the finality of an ICSID award. Specifically, it addresses the
possible endless internal appeals process that could lead to annulment
and an enforcement problem because of sovereign immunity, and
evaluates whether these problems present a fundamental and
insurmountable barrier to the expansion of ICSID arbitration. Part V
concludes by finding that the benefits of ICSID arbitration outweigh the
limitations and concerns about the process and offers suggestions for the
continued growth of this dispute resolution mechahism.
The Purpose of ICSID

II.
A.

13

History of ICSID Arbitration

Following a number of requests to act as a neutral advisor to settle
disputes among member states, 14 the World Bank established ICSID in
1966 under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States ("Convention"). 15 Before
this Convention, the World Bank members, specifically its President,
attempted to mediate disputes. 16 However, there existed growing
concerns that the World Bank was proceeding beyond its established
mandate; 17 specifically, the World Bank and its President were being
stretched too thin attempting to handle an increasing number of
disputes,' 8 and the World Bank's stated role as a guarantor of loans and
financing for projects in less developed countries would be diminished.' 9
Additionally, there existed a concern that member states "may be
reluctant to approach the [World] Bank for any purpose in case the
Banker also became the judge., 20 To address these concerns, the
President of the World Bank, in 1961, examihed the possibility of
creating an arbitration and conciliation mechanism that would be equally

13. The official drafting history of the ICSID Convention is fully documented in a
four-volume collection published through the World Bank. Vol. 1: Analysis of
Documents Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the Convention (1970); Vol II.
(in two parts): Documents Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the Convention
(in English) (1968); Vol. III: Documents Relatifs A l'Origine et A I'Elaboration de la
Convention (in French) (1968); Vol. IV: Documentos Relativos al Origen y a la
Formulaci6n del Convenio (in Spanish) (1969). Reference to this official history will be
made hereinafter as: History, Vol. num., page.
14. DR. K.V.S.K. NATHAN, THE ICSID CONVENTION: THE LAW
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 47 (2000).

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.; see also About ICSID, supra note 6.
NATHAN, supra note 14, at 48-50.
Id.at 49.
See About ICSID, supra note 6.
Shihata, supra note 11, at 100.
NATHAN, supra note 14, at 48-50.
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adequate for both investors and governments."
On October 14, 1966, after years of preparatory work by legal
experts from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the United States
and after approval by the Board of Governors of the World Bank,22
ICSID came into force as an autonomous international agency under the
auspices of the World Bank.23 The role of ICSID was to arbitrate and
conciliate investment disputes between signatory states and investors of
those states that were signatories to the convention. 24
The Administrative Council expanded the role of ICSID on
September 27, 1978, to include disputes that involved only one signatory
of the ICSID Convention and non-investment disputes, so long as the
dispute was related to a transaction that distinguished it from an ordinary
commercial transaction. 25 The ICSID Convention would not govern
these disputes directly. Rather, it would govern them under the
Additional Facility Rules created specifically for that purpose. 26
Furthermore, the Additional Facility Rules govern disputes that do not
directly arise out of an investment, 27 even though the term investment is
broadly defined, 28 as well 29as a general fact-finding process designed as a
"pre-dispute" mechanism.

21. President Eugene R. Black, Address of the World Bank 1961 Joint Annual
Meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Sept. 17-22, 1961),
SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS 7 (1969). See History, Vol II, 1 et seq.
22. NATHAN, supra note 14, at 50-51.
23. Mark Uugenblick & Delissa A. Ridgeway, Dispute Resolution in World
FinancialInstitutions, 10 J. INT'L ARB. 73, 78 (1993).
24. ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 25.
25. Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings
by the Secretariat of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1443 (1982) (Reproduced from Document ICSID/ll of June
1979), Art. 2 [hereinafter Additional Facility Rules]; see generally About ICSID, supra
note 6.
26. For example, Metaclad, an enterprise of the United States, a signatory to the
Convention, and Mexico, a nonsignatory, engaged in the ICSID Arbitration process in
1997, under the Additional Facility Rules. This arbitration was brought under the North
American Free Trade Agreement, which proscribes ICSID Arbitration. See Metaclad
Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001), 26 Y.B. COM. ARB.99 (2001), 13
WORLD TRADE & ARB.MATERIALS 47 (2001); 119 I.L.R. 618 (2002), 5 ICSID REP. 212
(2002).
27. Additional Facility Rules, supra note 25, Preamble A; see International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes: ICSID Additional Facility-Introductory Notes,
at http://www.worldbank.com/icsid/facility-archive/v.htm (last visited May 23, 2004).
28. See infra Part II. C.
29. "Fact-finding, as contemplated by the Additional Facility Rules is a process for
preventing, rather than settling legal disputes... . The reason for including fact-finding
in the Additional Facility was the need perceived in both private and public circles for
fact-finding proceedings in the 'pre-dispute' stage." Additional Facility Rules, supra
note 25, Preamble A; available at http://www.worldbank.com/ icsid/facilityarchive/vi.htm (last visited May 23, 2004).
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The popularity of ICSID arbitration has grown since its inception in
1966. There are presently 140 contracting states 30 to the ICSID
Convention, with another fourteen states as signatories. 31 Additionally,
advance consents to submit investment disputes to ICSID arbitration are
found in about twenty national investment laws, in over 900 BITs, and
under four recent multilateral trade and investment treaties: the North
American Free Trade Agreement, the Energy Charter Treaty, the
Cartagena Free Trade Agreement and the Colonia Investment Protocol of
Mercosur.3 2 In all, 145 disputes have been brought to ICSID, 115 of
which have been registered since 1994. 33
B. Benefits of ICSID Arbitration
Arbitration in general has many advantages as an avenue of dispute
resolution for international investors, sovereign states, and the global
commercial community as a whole. Arbitration allows the disputing
parties the freedom to select as arbitrators those individuals with
particular expertise in a specific commercial or economic field.3 4 While
arbitrators must be independent from the specific parties in dispute,35
they can have a familiarity with, and understanding of, the particular
industry-be it investments or other commercial activity.36 These
arbitrators are not necessarily experts in a particular type of law, but have
an intimate familiarity with the specific issues in question in a particular

30. Contracting States are those States that have signed the Convention and
performed whatever ratification process the individual State requires to ratify the treaty
within that State. States that have just signed the Convention, but have not ratified it
within their own State are deemed Signatory States.
31. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: List of Contracting
States and other Signatories to the Convention at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
constate/c-states-en.htm (last visited May 23, 2004) [hereinafter Contracting States].
32. See About ICSID, supra note 6.
33. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: List of Pending
Cases, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htm (last visited May 23, 2004);
Concluded Cases, supra note 10
34. CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 2.
35. Even though ICSID has a Panel of Arbitrators created by appointment from the
Contracting States, ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 13, this Panel is only a
recommended group of arbitrators, and parties are free to appoint arbitrators from outside
the Panel. ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 40. If parties cannot agree on the
arbitrators, then they will be selected from this Panel. ICSID Convention, supra note 8,
art. 43. All ICSID Arbitrators are required to meet the qualifications of Article 14(1),
which states that the arbitrators "shall be persons of high moral character and recognize
competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry, or finance, who may be relied upon
to exercise independent judgment." ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 14(1); accord
ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 40(2).
36. See generally Toby Landau, Composition and Establishment of the Tribunal, 9
AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 45, n.1 0 7 (1998).
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37
dispute, allowing for a more efficient resolution process.
Additionally, in international disputes, the neutrality of the ruling
body is a primary concern, whether in regards specifically to the parties,
or generally to the nationalities. 38 Arbitration allows for the selection of
arbitrators who have no connection with either party, both in nationality
and within the profession.39
Arbitration also minimizes direct hostility between the parties that is
inherent in a more adversarial judicial process. 40 This has the advantage
of being less disruptive to ongoing and future dealings among the parties,
an important feature in an international marketplace. 4 1 "Its more flexible
approach to adjudication is less destructive of business relationships and
allows the 2parties to continue to do business once the dispute has been
resolved.4
In addition to the traditional benefits of arbitration, ICSID
arbitration has benefits that are more expansive. ICSID arbitration was
established primarily "to assure foreign investors of protection under
international law from unilateral actions of host countries which could
jeopardize their investments." '4 3 The goal of ICSID is to provide a level
playing field for investors and host countries and to be a purely
international dispute resolution forum.44 It offers assurances to parties
that their investments are safe from unilateral actions of the host country,
while the host countries, which are mostly developing countries, are
assured of a dispute resolution forum insulated from the influence of
developed countries.4 5
ICSID allows investors to sue signatory states directly for 46
a
violation of an investment contract, without sovereign immunity issues,
and provides assurance that the foreign State will be bound to resolve
any dispute arising under the investment contract through ICSID
arbitration.4 7 Additionally, investors do not need to fear the foreign State

37.

Id.
See CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 3.
39. Id.
40. Richard Delgado, et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative DisputeResolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1367 (1985).
41. Id.
42. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 1,at 3.
43. Vincent 0. Orlu Nmehielle, Enforcing Arbitration Awards Under the
InternationalConventionfor the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention),
7 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 21, 23 (2001).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Sovereign immunity is not a problem at this particular stage of the arbitration.
Article 55 speaks only to the execution of the award. Problems with sovereign immunity
and execution will be discussed infra Part IV.
47. ICSID Convention, supra note 8, at art. 53-54.

38.
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appealing the decision to a court of that State.48
While signatories to the ICSID Convention are not bound to make
use of the ICSID process, 49 if they choose to resolve disputes through
ICSID Arbitration, either by contract 5° or by treaty, 5 1 that decision cannot
be unilaterally revoked.52 This gives assurance to the private investor
that the disagreement will not be heard in a biased environment as
unilaterally determined by their investment partner. While the contract
specifying ICSID arbitration may permissibly require exhaustion of
domestic remedies,5 3 once ICSID Arbitration commences, a State may
not seek to invalidate the findings or the decision of the Arbitration in its
own court system.54
Moreover, all ICSID Contracting States, whether parties to the
dispute or not, are required by the Convention to recognize and enforce
any ICSID arbitral awards. 55 The recognition of an award is the formal
confirmation by the State that the award is authentic and has full legal
48. Id.
49. Id. at art. 25(1).
50. This binding, irrevocable consent is a manifestation of the maxim pacta sunt
servanda (commitments must be honored). However, traditional "freedom of contract"
issues apply, such as clarity of agreement, equality of bargaining powers, etc. A court
can determine whether an agreement to proceed to ICSID arbitration actually exists. See
Georges R. Delaume, The Finality of Arbitrations Involving States. Recent
Developments, 5 ARB. INT'L 21, 24 et seq. (1989).
5 1. It is important to note, however, that a mere reference to ICSID does not
necessarily bind a State to ICSID. For example, the BIT between the Netherlands and
Pakistan in 1988 states that the contracting party "shall assent to any demand ... for
arbitration or conciliation, to the Centre [referring to ICSID]." This is not an agreement
to ICSID, but an agreement to agree to ICSID and, while denying a request for ICSID
arbitration could be construed as a violation of the BIT, it will likely not be construed as a
violation if the ICSID Convention. See SCHREUER, supra note 9, at 216-18; Pierre
Lalive, The First 'World Bank' Arbitration (Holiday Inns v. Morocco)-Some Legal
Problems, 51 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 123 (1980), reprintedin 1 ICSID REP. 645 (1983).
In addition, at least one contracting party must be a signatory of the ICSID
Convention. If an agreement mentions ICSID and the parties are not states, or members
of states, that have signed the ICSID Convention, the reference is void. This issue
appears most often in multilateral treaties. For example, NAFTA includes an express
reference to ICSID arbitration, but neither Canada no Mexico are signatories of the
ICSID Convention. While ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration would be available in
disputes between Canadian or Mexican investors and the U.S. or between U.S. Investors
and Canada or Mexico, it would not be available when Canada and Mexico are the only
two parties represented.
52. See SCHREUER, supra note 9, at 216-18.
53. ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 24.
54. Id. at art. 53(1). There is, however, an internal appeal mechanism available for
ICSID decisions. See discussion infra Part IV.
55. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 911. It is important to note, however, that
only final awards are subject to this mandatory recognition. Any intermediary awards,
such as findings of jurisdiction or matters of procedure, may be subject to review
(provided they are not incorporated into the award itself). See SCHREUER, supra note 9,
at 1110-11.
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effect. 56 Recognition provides two fundamental effects. First, the
requirement to recognize an ICSID award serves as resjudicata for the
particular action.57 This means that the "claim on which the award has
decided must not be the subject of another proceeding before a domestic
court or arbitral tribunal. 58 Second, recognition of an award, in most
cases, serves as a first step leading to enforcement of the award.59 While
enforcement itself may be subject to possible sovereign immunity
6
0 recognition of the award is not subject to the same
questions,61
concerns.

The overall effect of the ICSID Convention is more far-reaching
than a simple enunciation of the rights of investors in foreign countries,
or the particular methodologies of any resulting arbitrations. The ICSID
Convention gives investors the confidence and reassurances necessary to
invest in a foreign State. "[ICSID's] paramount objective is to promote a
climate of mutual confidence between investors and States favorable to
increasing the flow of resources to developing countries under
reasonable circumstances. 62
Intrinsically, the existence of the ICSID Convention is also in the
best interest of the countries benefiting from foreign investors. "[T]he
Convention is aimed to protect, to the same extent and with the same
vigor the investor and the host State, not forgetting that to protect
investments is to protect the general interest of development and of
developing countries." 63 Thus, the ICSID Convention fosters a favorable
environment, which may not otherwise exist, for the exchange and
sharing of financial resources between developing and developed
countries.
C. Limitations of ICSID Arbitration
There are two definite limitations to ICSID arbitration, and its
56. ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 54(1).
57. SCHREUER, supra note 9, at 1110-11 (citing Aron Broches, The Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 136
RECUEIL DES COURS 331, 400 (1972-II)); History, Vol II, 344, 519.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1115.
60. See discussion infra Part IV.
61. See, e.g., S.A.R.I. Benvenutti et Bonfant v. Gouvernement de la republique du
Congo, Judgment of June 26, 1981, CA Paris, at 108 J. DU DROIT INT'L 843 (1981);
translated in 20 I.L.M. 877 (1981) (removing a limitation on the enforcement of an
ICSID award provided by the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance (the court of
first instance) of Paris).
62. Ibrahim Shihata, ICSID Secretary--General,Towards a Greater Depolitization
of Investment Disputes:the Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REv.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 4
(1986).
63. Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 1 ICSID Rep. 400 (1983).

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1

ability to expand, as it exists presently. 64 First, ICSID jurisdiction exists,
by definition, only where a dispute arises out of an investment. 65 The
ICSID Convention was enacted mainly to assure private investors that it
66
was safe to invest in a foreign State and to encourage such investments.
However, the drafters of the Convention consciously did not define the
term investment. In drafting the Convention, there was much debate over
whether the limitation to disputes of investments should even exist, let
alone how that term should be defined.67 The chief architect of ICSID,
the General Counsel of the World Bank in 1961, actually advised against
defining the term investment, seeing any definition as an unnecessary
limitation on the scope of potential ICSID authority.6 8 However, many
of the national delegates wanted such a limitation.69
The first draft of the Convention defined investment as "any
contribution of money or other assets of economic value for an indefinite
period or, if the period be defined, for not less than five years., 70 After
much debate and disagreement, this definition was removed and no other
put in its place. 7' The only definition of investment remaining as an
official part of the ICSID Convention can be interpreted from the first
phrase of the Preamble:
"Considering the need for international
cooperation for economic development, and the role of private
international investment therein. 7 2
Today, it is difficult to define fully the term investment for the
purposes of the ICSID Convention.7 3 Parties can agree as to whether
64. The biggest limitations to ICSID Arbitration are the perception that arbitrations
are subject to an endless stream of internal appeals, as well as subject to fail due to
sovereign immunity from execution. CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 911-915. These
issues will be addressed infra Part IV.
65. The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly
out of an investment, between a Contracting State ... and a national of another
Contracting State." Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States, supra note 8, at Art. 53(1) (emphasis added).
66. See NATHAN, supra note 14, at 105.
67. See SCHREUER, supra note 9, at 121-25.
68. Id. at 121-22.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 122; History, Vol. I, 116.
71. Id. at 122-24.
72. ICSID Convention, supra note 8, Preamble.
73. This comment does not purport to define the term investment. One method is to
use the ordinary meaning of the word, "best described by the International Monetary
Fund as foreign direct investment to share in an enterprise operating in a State other than
the investor whose purpose is to participate in the management of the enterprise."
NATHAN, supra note 14, at 115. However, the ordinary meaning is by no means the
undisputed meaning of the word in terms of the ICSID Convention. See, e.g.,
Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe, The Jurisdiction of the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes, 19 INDIAN J. OF INT'L L. 166, 177-81 (1979) (giving
different definitions

of investment from economic

science and various Bilateral
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individual transactions are actually investments, and are therefore subject
to ICSID arbitration.74 However, the Tribunal appointed to a particular
dispute will have the ultimate say over whether a transaction is or is not
considered an investment.7 5 As technology grows, and the globalization
of trade and economy increases, satisfactorily defining the word
investment may become increasingly difficult.
The second limitation to the ICSID Convention is that any change
to, or alteration of, the Convention must be done by amendment as
defined by Articles 65 and 66 of the Convention. Specifically, under
Article 66(1), "[e]ach amendment shall enter into force 30 days after...
[a]ll Contracting States have ratified, accepted or approved the
amendment., 76 With the number of Contracting States reaching 150,
logistically this process becomes unwieldy to the point of being
impractical.77
Initially, the Convention required a "qualified majority of the
Administrative Council" for the adoption of an amendment. 78 After
several delegates to the Convention balked at the idea that they would be
forced to comply with an amendment that they did not agree to follow,
the language was changed to require adoption by all signatories before an
amendment became effective. 79 As of this date, no proposed amendment
has ever been made under Article 65.80 As the number of contracting
States grows, this will become increasingly unlikely.
There is a way around this amendment process, as was
demonstrated by the creation of the Additional Facility Rules in 1978.
Investment Treaties).
74. SCHREUER, supra note 9, at 125-32.
75. ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 41.
76. Id., art. 66(1).
77. See infra Part III. A.
78. SCHREUER, supra note 9, at 1266.
79. Id. at 1266-67. There exists debate whether groups of States can apply a
proposed amendment inter se among those states that have accepted the amendment, as
articulated by Article 40 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 155 U.N.T.S.
331, reprintedin 63 AM. J.INT'L L. 875 (1969). See e.g. W. Michael Reisman, Repairing
ICSID's Control System: Some Comments on Aron Broches' 'Observations on the
Finalityof ICSID Awards,' 7 ICSID REv.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 196, 209-11 (1992); but see
Aron Broches, On the Finality of Awards: A Reply to Michael Reisman, 8 ICSID REV.FOREIGN INV. L.J. 92, 100 (1993). Without addressing the fundamental interpretive
issues of the debate, the language of Article 66(1) appears clear that no official
Amendment can take place without ratification of all the signatories. However, this does
not stop individual parties from choosing particular "rules of a treaty not yet in force" per
Article 42(1) and 42(3). See SCHREUER, supra note 9, at 566. Parties are cautioned,
however, that if their choices result in a situation where there is no agreed-upon law that
applies, the Tribunal is required to apply the "law of the contracting State" and "such
rules of international law as may be applicable" as stated ICSID Convention, supra note
8, art. 42(1).
80. SCHREUER, supra note 9,at 1265.
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However, the "Additional Facility proceedings operate [only] in analogy
to ICSID proceedings." 81 The Additional Facility itself, a mechanism
activated only when one of the parties of the dispute is not a signatory to
the Convention, cannot be seen as part of the Convention but as
guidelines to a private contract between parties.
III.

Possible Reasons for the Increased Number of ICSID Arbitrations

A.

The Rise in the Number of Signatories

In 1991, Jan Paulsson, former Vice President of the London Court
of International Arbitration, hypothesized that a rise in the number of
ICSID cases would come as a result of Latin American and former
82
Communist States accepting and using the ICSID Convention.
Additionally, he believed that ICSID Arbitration would grow if preexisting investment treaties from States would begin to use, or continue
to use, the ICSID Convention as the chosen method of dispute resolution
when the old treaties expire and new treaties are created.83 An analysis
of the last twelve years shows that both of these factors exist, and as a
result, the use of the ICSID Convention has exploded.
There were ninety-five signatories to the ICSID Convention in its
first twenty-five years. 84 In the last twelve years, fifty-seven new
signatories were added, including Bosnia and Herzegovina (1997),
Bulgaria (2000), Colombia (1993) Estonia (1992), Guatemala (1995),
Latvia (1997), Nicaragua (1994), and Serbia and Montenegro (2002). 85
The sixteen new cases registered with ICSID since July 2003-nearly
equal to the number of cases ICSID handled in its first twenty years of
existence 86 -include older signatories such as El Salvador (1982),87
Hungary (1986),88 Niger (1965),89 Pakistan (1965), 90 and the Philippines
81.
82.

Id. at 1268.
Jan Paulsson, ICSID's Achievements and Prospects,6 ICSID REv.-FOREIGN INV.

L.J. 380, 398 (1991).

83. Id.
84. See Contracting States, supra note 31.
85. Id.
86. See discussion supra Part I.
87. Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Rep. of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26
(registered Oct. 10, 2003, currently pending) (concerning a motor vehicle inspection
facility).
88. ADC Affiliate Ltd. and ADC & ADMC Mgmt. Ltd. v. Rep. of Hung., ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/16 (registered July 17, 2003, currently pending) (concerning an airport
project).
89. TG World Petroleum Ltd. v. Rep. of Niger, ICSID Case No. CONC/03/1
(registered Dec. 9, 2003, currently pending) (concerning an oil exploration concession).
90. Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Rep. of Pak., ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/29, (registered Dec. 1. 2003, currently pending) (concerning a highway
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(1978), 9 1 as well as recent signatories Argentina (1991),92 Bulgaria
93
(2000),
and Peru (1991).94 It is clear that old and new signatories alike
are using the ICSID Convention in greater numbers.95
B.

The Rise in the Number of BITs

The first modem BIT was created by Germany from 1959-1961 to
protect its investors in foreign countries.9 6 Over the next twenty-five
years, an increased number of European countries created BITs with
developing countries. 97 It is only since the late 1980s, however, that
BITs have come to be "universally accepted instruments for the
promotion and legal protection of foreign investments. 98
construction contract).
91. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide v. Rep. of the Phil., ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/25, (registered Oct. 9, 2003, currently pending) (concerning the construction
of an airport terminal).
92. Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de
Barcelona, S.A. and Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua, S.A. v. Argentine Republic,
ICS1D Case Nos. ARB/03/17, ARB/03/18 and ARB/03/19 (registered July 17, 2003,
currently pending) (concerning a water services concession); Telef6nica S.A. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/20 (registered July 21, 2003, currently
pending) (concerning a telecommunications enterprise); Enersis, S.A. and others v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/21 (registered July 22, 2003, currently
pending) (concerning an electricity distribution enterprise); Electricidad Argentina S.A.
and EDF International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/22 and
ARB/03/23 (registered August 12, 2003, currently pending) (concerning an electricity
distribution enterprise); Unisys Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/27
(registered Oct. 15, 2003, currently pending) (concerning an information storage and
management project); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/30
(registered Dec. 8, 2003, currently pending) (concerning a water and sewer services
concession agreement).
93. Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Rep. of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 (registered
Aug. 19, 2003, currently pending) (concerning an oil refinery).
94. Duke Energy Int'l Peru Investments No.1 Ltd. v. Rep. of Peru, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/28 (registered Oct. 24, 2003, currently pending) (concerning a power generation
project).
95. The number of new signatories to the ICSID Convention involved in ICSID
proceedings may be even higher than appears at present. It is impossible to gauge the
exact number of new signatories using the ICSID Convention because only the recipient
country is known. The nationality of the investors in the preceding cases remains an
issue to be determined by the constituted tribunal and may well involve investors from
new signatory countries.
96.

UNITED

NATIONS

CENTRE

ON TRANSNATIONAL

CORPORATIONS,

BILATERAL

INVESTMENT TREATIES, 8 (Graham & Trotman eds., 1988). According to this treatise,
Germany was said to be particularly sensitive to investment protection as its investors
had lost their foreign assets in many countries following the two world wars. Id.
97. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: Chronological
List of Bilateral Investment Treaties at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/i-1.htm
(last visited May 23, 2004).
98. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: Introduction to
Bilateral Investment Treaties at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/intro.htm (last
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Of the over 1,100 BITs currently in existence, more than 800 have
been finalized since 1987, by a growing number of countries. 99 This
rapid increase in the number of BITs appears to be a growing trend. 100
Most countries that have an established BIT program continue to pursue
opportunities to enter into new treaties. 0 1 In addition, a number of
countries that have refrained from concluding BITs have begun in recent
years to fully negotiate and sign such treaties. 10 2 BITs are no longer
concluded exclusively between capital-exporting and capital-importing
of BITs are concluded between
countries; an increasing number
03
developing countries themselves. 1
Almost all modem BITs include provisions dealing with disputes
between one of the parties and investors having the nationality of the
other party. 104 In this respect, most BITs can, and do, provide for
arbitration under the ICSID Convention. 10 5 The large number of
consents given in this manner (in over 900 treaties) has been reflected in
ICSID's caseload. 10 6 Over half of the cases pending before ICSID at
present (including two conducted under its Additional Facility Rules)
17
have been initiated in reliance on consents given in treaty provisions. 0

visited May 23, 2004).
99. Id.
100. See Jorge F. Prez-L6pez & Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, The Contribution of BITs
to Cuba's Foreign Investment Program,32 LAW & POL'Y ININT'L Bus. 529, 532 (2001).
The boom in BITs in the 1990s is attributable to a number of factors. The first
factor was the opening to foreign investment brought about by evolution
toward a market economy in the former socialist countries of Eastern and
Central Europe and in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.
Second, the recognition among developing countries of the positive role in
economic development that FDI can play and the intense competition among
countries to attract FDI [Foreign Direct Investment] also lead to a large
increase in BITs. Third, BITs growth is also attributable to shrinkages in
foreign aid generally and difficulties on the part of many developing countries
in obtaining additional foreign financing via debt. The final factor stems from
a growing consensus among developed and developing countries, as well as
transition economies, that it is in a country's national interest to provide
increased legal protection to FDI.
Id.
101. See id. (citing UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID-1990S 10 (1998)).

102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: Introduction to
Bilateral Investment Treaties at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/intro.htm (last
visited May 23, 2004).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. For a list of cases submitted to the Centre, see International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes: ICSID Cases at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
cases/cases.htm (last visited May 23, 2004).
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It is clear that those countries forming BITs have enough confidence in
the ICSID arbitration system to continue using it, and that Jan Paulsson's
assertion 10 concerning
the growth of ICSID was correct on both
8
accounts.
IV. Overcoming a Perceived Weakness of ICSID Arbitration-The
Finality of an ICSID Award
One of the largest perceived problems of ICSID Arbitration is the
ability to obtain "final and binding ICSID arbitral awards."' 0 9 This
problem manifests itself in two distinct areas: an internal appeals
process leading to annulment of awards and states claiming sovereign
immunity from the execution of the award.' 10
A. Internal Appeals andAnnulments"'
Article 52 allows for the annulment of an ICSID award on the
following limited grounds:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted;
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the tribunal;
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of
procedure; or
(e) that the award has failed to State the reasons on which it is
based.112

For the first nineteen years of the ICSID Convention, this provision lay

108. See Paulsson supra, note 82.
109. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 911.
110. This is distinct from sovereign immunity from recognition of the award,
discussed supra Part II. B. See ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 55.
111. It is important to note that the ICSID Convention does not allow for appeals.
However, many feel that the annulment process contained in the ICSID Convention is in
essence an appeals process, so I have included both concepts together in this section.
There are two distinct differences between the concept of an appeal and of an annulment.
As to the first, the result of a successful application for an annulment is the
invalidation of the original decision. The result of a successful appeal is its
modification.... As to the second element, annulment is only concerned with
the legitimacy of the process of the decision: it is not concerned with its
substantive correctness. Appeal is concerned with both.
SCHREUER, supra note 9, at 891-92.
112. ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art 52(1).
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dormant. That changed in 1985, when the decision in Klckner v.
Cameroon was annulled on the grounds that the Tribunal manifestly
exceeded its powers."13
Since the annulment of the ICSID decision in Kl6ckner, numerous
commentators have feared that the annulment provisions of Article 52
would result in an unmanageable internal appeal process.' 14 If awards
can be revisited by a new tribunal, one that is free to disagree with the
original tribunal's findings and issue a new award (or, at least, the
cancellation of the old award), then can the initial ICSID award ever be
considered final?
In fact, however, there have been only five additional requests for
annulments of ICSID awards post-Kl6ckner.1 5 One of these requests
appeared in Kl6ckner, when the parties were denied a request that the
second award be annulled.' 1 6 Two of the five additional requests arose
from one case, Amco v. Indonesia,117 where one of the requests was
granted and the second was denied." 8 The fourth request, SPP.v. Egypt,
was settled before a decision on annulment could be reached." 9 In the
last request, MINE v. Guinea, the parties settled their dispute soon after
the award was annulled but before a new tribunal commenced. 20 In
order to understand the possible effects of these annulments, the
must each be
decisions of the Tribunals in Kldckner, Amco, and MINE
21
examined to discover the reasons for the annulments.'
The tribunal in Kl6ckner was to reach a decision on the case based
on "Cameroonian law based on French laws or French civil law."' 22 The
113. Klockner v. Cameroon: Decision on Annulment, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2
(May 3, 1985), reprintedin 2 ICSID REP. 116 (1986).
114. See, e.g., W.M. Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID
Arbitration, 1989 DuKE L.J. 739 (1989); M.B. Feldman, The Annulment Proceedingsand
the Finality of ICSID Arbitral Awards, 2 ICSID REv.-FOREIGN INv. L.J. 85 (1987); D.A.
Redfern, ICSID-Losing its Appeal?, 3 ARB. INT'L 98 (1987).
115. See SCHREUER, supra note 9, at 897.
116. The ad hoc committee's decision remains unpublished. See SCHREUER, supra
note 9, at 898.
117. Amco Asia et al. v. The Rep. of Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1 (May 16,
1986), 1 ICSID REP. 389 (1993).
118. Decision on Annulment, 17 December 1992. The ad hoc committee's decision
remains unpublished. See SCHREUER, supra note 9, at 900.
119. S. Pac. Prop. Ltd. v. Arab Rep. of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3 (May 20,
1992), 3 ICSID REP. 189 (1995).
120. Mar. Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Rep. . of Guinea, ICSID Case No.
ARB/84/4 (Jan. 6, 1988), 4 ICSID REP. 61 (1997).
121. My brief discussion of these cases is only to gain perspective on the reasons for
annulment and the possible effect they could have on subsequent cases. For an excellent,
and more detailed, analysis of these cases, see Aron Broches, Observations on the
Finality of ICSID Awards, 6 ICSID REv.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 321 (1991); see also
SCHREUER, supra note 9, at 897-902.
122. Broches, supra note 121, at 340 (citing the Klnckner decision). The tribunal

20041

ICSID's RESURGENCE

committee, however, did not ascertain a particular principle of French
law but merely presumed its existence. 123 The ad-hoc committee
considering the annulment request concluded that mere postulating on a
legal principle without demonstrating its existence is considered not
applying the law of the124
Contracting State as required under Article 42 of
the ICSID Convention.
In Amco, the tribunal identified the proper Indonesian law in
question but failed to apply that law in calculating the amount of money
that was invested in the project at issue.125 This miscalculation by the
tribunal resulted in a gross overstatement of the investment in question
thereby fundamentally changing what should have been the outcome of
the arbitration. 126 This, the ad hoc tribunal determined, was a "serious
departure
from a fundamental rule of procedure" as articulated in Article
127
52(d).
In MINE, the ad hoc committee did not annul the result of the initial
The committee
arbitration, but annulled the damages portion. 28
determined that the damages analysis of the tribunal was "inconsistent
and in contradiction with its analysis of certain damages theories" and
29
therefore failed to State the reasons on which the award was based.
While Indonesia claimed other grounds30 for annulment, the committee
only applied this Article 52(e) violation.
Many view the decisions in Kldckner and Amco as reviewing the
merits of the particular case and disturbing the fundamental principle of
arbitration: efficient and effective evaluation of a dispute.' 31 The fear is
that Article 52 could be used as an internal appeal process that would
disrupt the arbitral process and casts doubt on the finality of any ICSID
judgment. However, two fundamental points seem to contradict this
assertion.
First, the ad hoc committees in Klckner, Amco, and MINE did not
alter the decision, as would be the case in an appeal process. In
itself determined the applicable law based on Article 42 of the ICSID Convention.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 341.
125. Id. at 344-45.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 349.
128. Id. at 351.
129. Id. at 356.
130. Id. at 351.
131. SCHREUER, supra note 9, at 893 (citing (among others) T. de Berranger, L 'article
de la Convention de Washington du 18 mars 1965 et les premiers enseignments de sa
pratique, REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 93, 107 (1988); Emmanuel Gaillard, Centre
Internationalpour le Rglement des Diff~rends relatifs aux Divertissements (CIDRI):
Chronique des sentences arbitrales,114 J. DU DRorr INTERNATIONAL 135, 188 et seq.

(1987)).
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Klickner, the committee did not determine that the losing party should
win; they determined that the proper legal standard (indeed, that no legal
standard) was used by the tribunal to reach its decision and annulled it in
order to have a different arbitral tribunal decide the outcome of the case
based on the merits. 32 Amco seems most like a merits review in that the
committee determined that the Tribunal did not correctly apply
Indonesian law. In fact, it is "clear that the Tribunal did not merely fail to
apply the law correctly; it failed to apply the law at all. 33 The committee
factual determination of the tribunal but
in MINE did not nullify the1 34
annulled the damages portion.
Is this internal annulment process fundamentally fatal to the
development and growth of ICSID arbitration? The annulment process is
designed to remove the influence on the award of any external judicial
system, leading to the conclusion that the rendered award is truly anational. 35 Without any annulment process, fundamentally defective
awards such as in MINE could not be remedied. The history of ICSID
arbitrations, while not a definitive sign of future occurrences, has
demonstrated that the "endless appeals process," while possible in
theory, does not in fact exist.
A number of commentators have suggested the creation of a
permanent review board.136 An amendment creating such a review board
could contain language that all complaints about an award must be
132. Klockner v. Cameroon: Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee-Annulment
Application, 1 ICSID REv.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 89, 114-115 (1986) ("[I]t must be
acknowledged that in its reasoning, limited to postulating and not demonstrating the
existence of a principle or exploring the rules by which it can only take concrete form,
the Tribunal has not applied the law of the Contracting State.").
The law applied by the Tribunal will be examined by the ad hoc
133.
Committee, not for the purpose of scrutinizing whether the Tribunal committed
errors in the interpretation of the requirements of applicable law or in the
ascertainment or evaluation of the relevant facts to which such law has been
applied.. . [but] will limit itself to determining whether the Tribunal did in fact
apply the law it was bound to apply to the dispute. Failure to apply such law,
as distinguished from mere misconstruction of that law, would constitute a
manifest excess of powers on the part of the Tribunal and a ground for nullity
under Article 52(1)(b) of the Convention.
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: Decision of the Ad Hoc
Committee Setting Aside the Award Rendered on the Merits in the Arbitration between
Amco Asia Corporationet al. and Indonesia,25 I.L.M. 1439, 1446 (1986).
134. Broches, supra note 121, at 356 ("[T]he requirement that the Award must State
the reasons on which it is based is in particular not satisfied by contradictory reasons.").
135. "Whatever constraints and limitations apply to arbitration in domestic law cannot
impinge upon international arbitral agreements, proceedings, or award ... the transborder
arbitral process is, de facto, an autonomous and self-regulating international system of
adjudication." CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 32-33.
136. See, e.g., Broches, supra note 121, at 371-72; W. Michael Reisman, The
Supervisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: InternationalArbitration
and InternationalAdjudication, 258 RECUEIL DES COURs 23, 35 (1996).
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presented in one appeal, and that the decision of the review board is
final. This would alleviate the worry over multiple appeals and the lack
of finality of an award. However, the Convention itself must be
amended through Articles 65 and 66 for such a review board to exist, an
amendment that is unlikely to occur. 13 7 Because of the strict amendment
process of the ICSID Convention, the worry over an unfettered
annulment process may never be formally alleviated. The only true
assurances that investors and States have that this will not occur is the
fact that it has, to date, not occurred, and all parties involved, including
the ICSID arbitrators, are aware of the potential problem.
B.

Sovereign Immunity from Award Enforcement

The effectiveness of international arbitration ultimately depends on
138
whether the arbitral award can be enforced against the losing party.
The question of sovereign immunity in ICSID arbitrations is technical in
nature. Article 55 of the ICSID Convention states that "[n]othing in
Article 54 [concerning the requirement that all signatories must
recognize a rendered award] shall be construed as derogating from the
law in force in any Contracting State relating to immunity of that State or
of any foreign State from execution."' 139 In essence, the award rendered
140
by the ICSID Tribunal is given similar status to a court judgment.
However, "even court judgments may not be enforceable: the respondent
may be a1 State, and enjoy immunity from the jurisdiction of the local
14

courts.'

Article 55 only applies to a State's immunity from execution, not
jurisdiction or the recognition of an award. 142 Specifically, Article 54(3)
states that "execution of the award shall be governed by the laws
concerning the execution of judgments in the State in whose territories
such execution is sought." With ICSID awards, State immunity only
becomes a possibility when "concrete measures of execution are taken"
to actually enforce the award, typically after recognition of the award has
137. See discussion supra Part II. C.
138. Albert Jan Van den Berg, Some Recent Problems in the Practiceof Enforcement
Under the New York and ICSID Conventions, 2 ICSID REV.-FoREIGN INV L.J. 439, 442
(1987).
139. ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 55.
140. JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LowE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 270 (1999).
141. Id.at270-71.
142. "Under Art. 54(3) only execution but not recognition is governed by the law of
the forum State." SCHREUER, supra note 9 at 1143. Jurisdiction in an ICSID Arbitration
is governed by Article 25 and determined by the tribunal under Article 41. Recognition
of an ICSID award is governed by Article 54. See ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art.
25, 41, 54.
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143
been granted.
"The principle of restrictive immunity, according to which States
are immune from suits in respect of matters which are exercises of its
public authority (acta jure imperii) but not in respect of commercial
transactions which it has entered (acta jure gestionis), is generally
accepted." ' 44 Specific sovereign
immunity issues, though, depend on the
45
laws of the State of execution.
To alleviate the difficulty of sovereign immunity from suit, the
drafters of the ICSID Convention could have included a waiver of
immunity from execution. However, Article 55 was included in the
ICSID Convention to "make clear that the Convention did not seek to
change the laws of Contracting States with respect to immunity.' 4 6
Thus, it is clear that those parties contracting under the ICSID
Convention must still deal with sovereign immunity from execution
issues as they exist under current State law. As seen in Liberian Eastern
Timber Co. v. Government of Liberia (LETCO v. Liberia)147 and Soabi v.
Senegal,148 the law of sovereign immunity in this area could be
interpreted quite differently.
In LETCO v. Liberia, LETCO applied to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York to have an ICSID award
recognized and enforced in the United States. 49 The court entered an ex
partejudgment for the plaintiff, as it was required to do under the ICSID

143.

SCHREUER, supra note 9, at 1144.
144. COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 140, at 271. "The most widely accepted criterion
for immunity from execution is the nature of the assets which are to be the object of
enforcement... distinguish[ing] between commercial and non-commercial property
[property serving governmental purposes]." SCHREUER, supra note 9, at 1149. What
constitutes commercial and non-commercial property is beyond the scope of this
comment, but a discussion of this distinction can be found SCHREUER, supra note 9, at
1151-65.
145. A number of countries have adopted legislation to regulate State immunity,
including the United States (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976)), Great Britain (State Immunity Act 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1123
(1978)), and Australia (Foreign States Immunities Act 1985, 25 I.L.M. 715 (1986)).
There are also some international attempts to regulate State immunity, such as The
European Convention on State Immunity of 1972 (European Treaty Series No. 74, 11
I.L.M. 470 (1972)) and the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property of 1991 (30 I.L.M. 1563 (1991)).
146. Aron Broches, Awards Rendered Pursuant to the ICSID Convention: Binding
Force, Finality, Recognition, Enforcement, Execution, 2 ICSID REv.-FOREIGN INv. L.J.
287, 330 (1987).
147. Liberian E. Timber Co. (LETCO) v. Gov't of Liber., 650 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), reported in 2 ICSID REv.-FoREIGN INv. L.J. 188 (1987). See also Anne Joyce,
Arbitration: United States Court Recognition of ICSID Arbitral Award-Liberian
Eastern Timber Corp. v. Republic of Liberia, 29 HARv. INT'L L.J. 135 (1988).
148. Soabi v. Sen., 30 I.L.M. 1167(1991).
149. LETCO v. Liber. 2 ICSID REP. 343 (1986) (Award).
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Convention, and issued a writ of execution.15 0
LETCO sought to "execute its judgment against certain tonnage and
registration fees collected in the United States from ship owners flying
the Liberian flag."' 15 1 In response, Liberia invoked the United States
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 5 2 stating that the fees in
question are in essence taxes designed to raise revenues for the Republic
of Liberia and thus immune from execution since they are not
"property... used for a commercial activity."' 53 The District Court for
the Southern District of New York agreed that the assets were sovereign,
not commercial, and granted Liberia's motion to vacate the execution
against those specific assets.154 The court did make it clear that "LETCO
[was] not enjoined from issuing executions with respect to any properties
which [were] used for commercial activities and that [might have fallen]
155
within one of the exceptions delineated in section 1610."
LETCO then sought to execute the judgment against several
Liberian Embassy bank accounts in Washington, D.C. for "any credits
other than wages, salary, commissions or pensions of the defendant, The
Government of the Republic of Liberia, The Republic of Liberia, or The
Embassy of the Republic... of Liberia or any of their agencies, that are
used for commercial activities.' 5 6 The D.C. Circuit Court held that the
Embassy accounts were immune from execution, both because they
enjoyed diplomatic immunity under the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations'5 7 and because no exception of the FSIA applied to
150. LETCO, 650 F. Supp. at 75-76.
151. Anne Joyce, Arbitration: United States Court Recognition of ICSID Arbitral
Award - Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. v. Republic of Liberia, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 135,
136 (1988). Joyce states that these fees are collected by a New York-based corporation
under a system known as a "flag of convenience" shipping operation: where a ship is
owned in one country yet registered in another. By executing the judgment in the United
States against Liberian interests in the United States, LETCO invokes the laws of the
United States in this matter and not Liberia.
152. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976).
153. LETCO, 650 F. Supp. at 77. 28 U.S.C. 1610(a) provides exceptions to the
immunity of a foreign State from execution upon a judgment entered by a Court of the
United States if the property is or was "used for a commercial activity in the United
States." Id.
154. Id. at 77-78.
155. Id.
156. Liberian E. Timber Co. (LETCO) v. Gov't of Liber., 659 F. Supp. 606, 607
(D.D.C. 1987).
157. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes,
Apr. 18, 1961, art. 25, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3238, T.I.A.S. No. 7502.
The Vienna Convention provides in Article 25 that "the receiving State shall
accord full facilities for the performance of the functions of the mission." 23
U.S.T. at 3238.
The Liberian Embassy lacks the "full facilities" the
Government of the United States has agreed to accord if, to satisfy a civil
judgment, the Court permits a writ of attachment to seize official bank accounts
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deprive the bank accounts, which, in the court's opinion, were essentially
58
of a governmental nature, of their grant of sovereign immunity.1
In SOABI, an ICSID award had been rendered in favor of the
SOABI company in a dispute that arose when Senegal terminated
agreements relating to a construction project for low-income housing in
SOABI sought recognition of the award in France.
its capital.
Recognition was granted by the President of the Tribunal de grande
instance (the court of first instance) of Paris in an unpublished decision.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal of Paris vacated the recognition order.
The Court reasoned that, since SOABI had not proven the commercial
nature of the Senegalese assets that might be subject to execution
following recognition, to hold other than that recognition should be
denied would violate Senegal's immunity from execution and contravene
public policy. 5 9
The Court of Cassation annulled the Court of Appeal's decision and
ruled that the "Convention of Washington of March 18, 1965 [ICSID
Convention] has instituted, in its Articles 53 and 54, an autonomous and
simple system of recognition and enforcement which excludes the

used or intended to be used for purposes of the diplomatic mission. If the "full
facilities" to which the United States agreed to "accord" diplomatic immunity
did not include bank accounts off the premises of the mission, the Liberian
Embassy either would have to take grossly inconvenient measures, such as
issuing only checks drawn on a Liberian bank, or would have to run the risk
that judgment creditors of Liberia would cause the accounts the Embassy holds
at banks located in the United States to be seized for an indefinite length of
time, severely hampering the performance of the Embassy's diplomatic
functions.
LETCO, 659 F. Supp. at 607. The Court noted that Congress did not intend the FSIA to
affect diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention, but that "28 U.S.C. § 1609
explicitly states that Congress enacted the FSIA subject to existing international
agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act."
Id. at 608, n.3 (internal quotations omitted).
158. The Liberian Embassy bank accounts are utilized for the maintenance of the
full facilities of Liberia to perform its diplomatic and consular functions as the
official representative of Liberia in the United States of America, including
payment of salaries and wages of diplomatic personnel and various ongoing
expenses incurred in connection with diplomatic and consular activities
necessary to the proper functioning of the Embassy. The essential character of
the activity for which the funds in the accounts are used, therefore, undoubtedly
is of a public or governmental nature because only a governmental entity may
use funds to perform the functions unique to an embassy.
Id. at 610 (internal citations omitted).
159. Etat du Senegal v. Seutin es qualite de liquidateur amiable de laSOABI,
Judgment of Dec. 5, 1989, Court of Appeal, Paris, 117 JDI 141 (1990), with a comment
by Gaillard; 1990 REVUE DE L'ARBTRAGE 164, with a comment by Broches; 80 REVUE
CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 124 (1991), with a comment by Ziade. For an
English translation of the text of the decision, see 5 ICSID REv.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 135
(1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1341 (1990).
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system provided for in Articles 1498 et seq. of the New Code of Civil
Procedure and, in particular, the remedies therein provided. 1 60 Thus, the
court determined that the use of the ICSID Convention excluded any
recourse to the French rules on immunity or on recognition of foreign
awards, including public policy grounds, and allowed the execution of
the award.'16
With the seemingly opposing views of two different States on the
issue of execution of awards, is it possible for an investor to adequately
protect his or her interests in an international investment governed by the
ICSID Convention, and thus continue to use the Convention as a dispute
resolution mechanism? Perhaps the best way to solve this problem is the
inclusion of a waiver of immunity from execution clause in the
investment contract itself. Such an inclusion has been called "a matter of
elementary prudence.' ' 162 Consider the analysis and advice of Georges R.
Delaume, former Senior Legal Adviser for ICSID:
In the final analysis, the decisions of the Court of Cassation in the
SOABI case and its U.S. counterpart in the LETCO case are
encouraging acknowledgments of the effectiveness of the
Convention's recognition provisions. The decisions serve as a
reminder that if the parties wish to avoid the pitfalls of immunity
rules that may interfere with the execution of ICSID awards, they
would be well-advised to address63 the matter directly by means of
appropriate waivers of immunity.1
Simply including a waiver of immunity in a contract, however, does
not guarantee that immunity has been waived: waivers of immunity are
still subject to local law. 164 Additionally, when consent to ICSID
jurisdiction occurs through a BIT, rather than a private contract, States
may be unwilling, or unable, to alter any of the conditions of the
treaty.

165

The investor should do everything possible to secure any potential
investment before actually proceeding with it. This means that the
investor should insist on a waiver clause in any investment contract with
a foreign State, even if the reference to ICSID has previously been
160. France: Court of CassationDecision in SOABI (Seutin) v. Senegal, 30 I.L.M.
1167(1991).
161. Id.
162. Georges R. Delaume, How to Draft an ICSID Arbitration Clause, 7 ICSID REV.FoREIGN INV. L.J. 168, 194 (1992).
163. Georges R. Delaume, Decisions of Regional and Foreign Courts: FranceRecognition ofICSID Awards--Sovereign Immunity, 86 AM. J.INT'L. L. 138, 142 (1992).
164. SCHREUER, supra note 9, at 1165-66 ("[C]ertain waivers have to be explicit
while others may be given implicitly [while] ... [c]ertain forms of immunity may be
invalid even if agreed upon by the parties.").
165. Id. at 1166-67.
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established by a BIT. The investor should also know what States are
available for enforcement and execution of any potential judgment and
ensure that enough assets exist in States allowing the drafted waivers of
immunity. The more protection the investor has, both in writing and in
law, the more willing a State might be to settle a dispute in a manner
more favorable to the investor, or to even continue to faithfully perform
under the ,contract when the State otherwise would have abandoned the
contract and gambled on its immunity.
V.

Conclusion

"[T]he primary value of arbitration lies in its pragmatic qualities...
[providing] basic procedural fairness and access to adjudicatory
systems."' 166 The ICSID Convention arose out of global need for an
independent adjudicatory process and has risen to be a standard avenue
for international investment dispute resolutions. Considering the vast
number of BITs and multinational investment treaties that currently refer
to ICSID arbitration as their dispute resolution mechanism,1 67 and the
continued increase of the flow of foreign investments to developing
countries, it is clear that the utilization of the ICSID arbitration process
will continue to increase.
There are a few basic precautions those involved in the ICSID
arbitration process should observe so that it can continue being the
dispute mechanism of choice among international investors. Presently,
investors should not be overly concerned about the existence and state of
the appeals process, 168 as very few ICSID arbitrations are actually
granted appeals. ICSID arbitrators should take special care when issuing
judgments and awards to ensure that remains true: making sure that
decisions are well reasoned, based on the selected law, and not readily
appealable. Additionally, as a limited review is a hallmark of the
arbitration process, 169 any ad-hoc committee appointed by the SecretaryGeneral to consider an appeal should strictly follow the guidelines of
Article 52,17 realizing the repercussions of granting any such appeal. In
this instance, an ounce of prevention is definitely worth a pound, or
more, of cure.
The Convention amendment process continues to be a concern.
"[A] legal system must have the stability and predictability essential to
security, order, and evenhanded justice.., it must also have flexibility to
166. CARBONNEAU, supra note 1, at 1203.
167. See discussion supra Part III.
168. See discussion supra Part IV. A.
169. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 Wis. L. REV.
831, 914 (2001).
170. Discussion supra Part IV. A.
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change and ability to grow with the institutions and society it serves-the
capacity, in short to renew itself."' 71 If the Convention needs to be
amended, either to facilitate the growing number of arbitrations or to
expand its mandate beyond, or limit its mandate to a stricter definition of,
investment contracts, 172 that process will not be so easily accomplished.
While the creation of the Additional Facility Rules outside the formal
amendment process of the Convention proves that it is possible for the
Convention to adapt to necessary changes, 173 too many changes outside
the formal methods of amending the Convention could cause States to
abandon its use.
The strict amendment process, however, gives rise to notions of
predictability, a key to the growth of international investments. 174 As the
Convention's primary purpose is the promotion of economic
development through the facilitation of international investments,175 a
Convention favoring stability and predictability over the ability to
change and adapt may in fact be preferable. The increased use of the
Convention in BITs and private contracts shows that investors and States
alike have confidence in the ICSID arbitration process. In the end, the
ICSID Convention appears to be the correct balance of flexibility and
predictability needed to encourage confidence in international
investments and, with a bit of care on the part of the Administrative
Council and the arbitrators themselves, can continue to be the dispute
resolution method of choice for international investors for years to come.

171. Pamela J. Stephens, The New Retroactivity Doctrine: Equality, Reliance, and
Stare Decisis, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1515, 1572 (1998) (citing ROBERT E. KEETON,
VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE v (1969)).
172. As "investment" remains undefined, there may be cause in the near future to
amend the Convention to better define its scope, especially if the number of cases
submitted to arbitration becomes unmanageable.
173. SCHREUER, supra note 9, at 1267-68 ("The adoption of the Additional Facility
Rules in 1978 ... shows that there is some flexibility without a formal amendment of the
Convention.").
174. Daniel E. Troy, When Does Retroactivity Cross the Line?: Winstar, Eastern
Enterprises,and Beyond, 51 ALA. L. REv. 1329, 1344 (2000) ("Predictability is essential
to continuing investments in productive enterprises.").
175.

SCHREUER, supra note 9, at 4.

